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ABSTRACT 
In order to promote financial stability, regulatory authorities pay a lot of attention in setting 
minimum capital levels. In addition to these requirements, financial institutions calculate their 
own economic capital reflecting the unexpected losses and true risk according to the specific 
characteristics of their portfolio. The current Basel I framework pays little or no attention to 
the creditworthiness of a borrower in deciding on the regulatory capital requirements. As a 
result, a lot of banks remove low-risk assets from their balance sheets and only retain 
relatively high risk assets on balance. The recently introduced Basel II framework should 
result in a further convergence between regulatory and economic capital. However, recent 
papers (Elizalde et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2002 and Jacobson et al. 2006) argue that also 
under Basel II, regulatory and economic capital will have different determinants. This paper 
first gives an overview of capital adequacy and then further describes the differences and 
similarities between economic and regulatory capital based on a literature review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial institutions play a crucial role in today’s globalized economy. 
Because of their expertise and by monitoring and screening potential borrowers, these 
financial intermediaries have a comparative advantage in overcoming asymmetric 
information (Diamond, 1984). As such, one of the fundamental roles of these financial 
intermediaries is capital allocation by lending funds that have been deposited on their 
accounts. These deposits are subject to a “first-come-first-serve” rule. In a negative 
environment with rumours about the bank holding low quality assets, this could 
eventually lead to a bank run. 
Over the past decades, banks have been flooded with new trends like 
disintermediation, low competitive margins, expansion of off-balance sheet products 
dominated by derivatives etc. As a result, the risk profile of financial institutions has 
evolved dramatically. To a broad extent financial institutions are typically confronted 
with credit, market and operational risk.  The default history of financial institutions 
shows that credit risk is the most important threat to bank solvency. Credit risk can be 
defined as the risk of a decrease in value or a loss due to an unexpected detorioration 
in the credit quality of a counterparty. In the light of the recent evolutions, this risk 
factor has become more complex than ever before, and revolutionary changes are 
taking place in the management of credit risk.  
To protect banks against failure and to prevent an economic crisis due to 
contagion and systematic risk, debtholders and regulators want banks to maintain a 
certain level of capital. However, bank management and shareholders have an 
incentive to minimize capital as this frees up economic resources that can be used for 
value creating activities and as such increase the return on equity. As a result of these 
conflicting interests, bank capital needs to be optimized. 
In order to further promote financial stability, regulatory authorities pay a lot 
of attention to setting minimum capital levels. They could address this issue by setting 
capital requirements that decreases the default probability. However, increasing equity 
with a certain amount might go along with social costs (Berger, 1995). As such 
regulators should make a trade-off between the benefits of reducing systematic risk by 
imposing high capital levels and the associated social cost of declining financial 
intermediation (Santomero and Watson, 1977).  
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Besides these regulatory requirements, financial institutions calculate their 
own economic capital reflecting the unexpected losses and true risk according to the 
specific characteristics of their portfolio (Jackson et al., 2002).  
Eventhough there is an extended literature about capital regulation and Basel 
II, there is no paper that gives an overall picture about the determinants and 
challenges of both economic and regulatory capital. Furthermore the existing 
literature on economic capital is small and the theoretical comparison to regulatory 
capital is practically unexplored. To our knowledge, only the paper of Elizalde et al. 
(2006) compares economic to regulatory capital. However in their model they define 
economic capital as the capital that would be chosen by the shareholders in the 
absence of capital regulation. In our paper economic capital coexists with regulatory 
capital and is defined as the capital level that is required to cover unexpected losses 
with a certain probability. Furthermore, in this paper we focus on the way both capital 
numbers are calculated rather than on what is driving them from a theoretical point of 
view. 
The paper continues with an overview of capital adequacy and then further 
describes the differences and similarities between economic and regulatory capital 
based on a literature review. 
 
II. CAPITAL ADEQUACY – REGULATORY CAPITAL 
Financial institutions are able to forecast the average risk and associated credit 
loss of their assets. These so called expected losses1 (EL) are part of doing business 
and should be covered by and reflected in the pricing of assets and through 
provisioning. However banks might also experience losses that exceed expectations. 
These so called unexpected losses (UL) should to a certain extent be covered by bank 
capital. 
“At some level the capital is adequate, implying that the deposits are safe 
enough” (Sharpe, 1978). This quote shows that capital requirements exist to reduce 
the probability that banks will fail.  
                                               
 
1
 The expected loss of a portfolio can be defined as the multiplication of PD, LGD and EAD (cf. infra).  
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The principal concern of the authorities who set capital requirements is the 
protection of the economy against systematic risks. Furthermore they are intended to 
protect government, central banks, depositholders and other stakeholders against the 
cost of financial distress, agency problems, etc…  
By imposing high capital levels, small investors are protected and potential 
systematic effects of bank failure are countered. However extremely high capital 
requirements might create efficiency costs (Jackson et al., 2002).  
To prevent negative consequences of setting inaccurate capital requirements, 
regulatory authorities should take into account this trade-off. Possible negative 
consequences are the diversion of financial resources from their most productive use, 
artificial incentives to take off-balance sheet risk etc. 
We will now further discuss the different components of capital. It should be 
noted that both the assets and the capital used in regulatory capital ratio are hard to 
quantify.  
 
2.1 Quantifying book capital 
In 1988, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), introduced the Basel I 
Accord that set the minimum capital requirement at 8% of risk weighted assets, 
consisting at least for 50% out of tier 1 capital (cf. infra).  Under Basel II this 
numerator remains unchanged.   
In their statement, the BIS stresses that common stocks and retained earnings 
should be the core elements of capital (BIS, 1998). These funding sources are 
available to absorb potential losses and are considered the most reliable and liquid. 
Tier 2 capital, which mainly consists of subordinated debt and general provisions, but 
also includes undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves and hybrid instruments, is far 
less reliable.2  
Berger et al. (1995) state that in order for an instrument to qualify for 
regulatory capital, three characteristics should hold: it should be junior to the claims 
of the deposit insurer, it should be patient money and it should reduce the moral 
hazard incentives of the bank. In some circumstances equity only meets the first two 
objectives.  
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The actual effect of bank equity on portfolio risk is highly contested. Koehn 
and Santomero (1980), Keeton (1988) and Kim and Santomero (1988) show that a 
relative increase in equity can have both a positive (increase) and negative (decrease) 
effect on the bank portfolio risk.  However Furlong and Keeley (1989, 1990) only 
found a negative effect on portfolio risk for value maximizing banks with publicly 
traded stocks. This was again contested by Gennotte and Pyle (1991) under the 
assumption of decreased return on investment. Empirical evidence reveals a negative 
relation between the level of equity and the risk profile of a bank (Lane et al (1986), 
Avery and Berger (1991b), Cole and Gunther (1995)). However Thomson (1991) 
argues that the level of equity has no direct effect on bank performance.  
Also subordinated debt meets all the criteria identified by Berger et al. (1995); 
empirical evidence for the third criteria is somewhat weaker. 
 
2.2 Quantifying credit risk weighted assets 
The denominator of the capital ratio should reflect the bank’s risk exposure. 
Practice shows that it is not that straightforward to develop a measure of risk exposure 
that is both accurate and easy to apply across different financial institutions.  
 
2.2.1 Evolution from Basel I to Basel II 
Capital regulation should take into account the changes in banking and risk 
management. Still, the 1988 Basel I framework pays little or no attention to the 
creditworthiness of a borrower in deciding on the regulatory capital requirements. As 
such, the denominator of the capital ratio fails to capture the true economic risk. As a 
result, a lot of banks remove low-risk assets from their balance sheets and only retain 
relatively high risk assets on balance (Jones, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                       
 
2
 For purpose of completeness we should mention the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision also distinguishes 
tier 3 capital. As tier 3 capital, mainly constituted from short term subordinated debt, only serves to cover market 
risk, and as such can not be used as a cushion against credit risk, we will not go into further detail. 
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By reallocating their asset portfolio, differences between economic and 
regulatory capital are being arbitraged3. Concerns about the possible extent of these 
arbitrage actions, encouraged the Committee on Banking Supervision to revise the 
existing framework and in 1999, the first consultative paper on Basel II was 
published.   
The major objective of Basel II is to further align regulatory capital with 
economic capital demanded by its different counterparties (Gordy and Howells, 
2004).  
Furthermore, Basel II should “develop a framework that would further 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system while 
maintaining sufficient consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a 
significant source of competitive inequality among internationally active banks” 
(BCBS, June 2006).  
This new framework is based on three reinforcing pillars depicted in the figure 
below. Pillar 1 defines new risk-based requirements for credit risk and a new charge 
for operational risk, Pillar 2 sets requirements for supervisory review, and Pillar 3 is 
related to market discipline and the associated disclosure standards. In this article we 
will focus on the first pillar and more specifically on the capital requirements for 
credit risk.  
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
Within the new framework, there are two approaches to calculate the capital 
requirements for credit risk: the standardised approach and the internal rating based 
(IRB) approach.  
                                               
 
3
 Regulatory arbitrage refers to the fact that a bank takes advantage from the difference between 
regulatory and economic capital. If the true risk of a bank asset is higher than the regulatory weight, the 
bank will have an incentive to keep these assets on balance. However if the true risk is lower, the bank 
will remove the asset by means of securitisation.  As such, the presence of regulatory arbitrage will 
increase the overall risk of financial institutions.  
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Under the Standardised Approach, the risk weights depend on an external 
rating provided by external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs). When no external 
rating is available, a default value is applied that is a conservative estimate of the 
average risk for counterparties. Under the standardized approach a limited number of 
risk mitigations tools such as financial collateral and guarantees are allowed.  Because 
of its simplicity, especially small and medium sized financial institutions are expected 
to adopt this approach. The standardised approach is conceptually quite similar to the 
current framework, but it is more risk-sensitive. Where Basel I only makes a 
distinction in ratings between corporates, sovereigns and interbank facilities, the 
standardised approach aims at providing a greater sensitivity to credit risk by creating 
different risk buckets within each category based on external ratings (Van Roy, 2005).  
Notwithstanding this evolution, there is still insufficient differentiation among 
creditors and as the capital requirements for the investment grade facilities remain to 
be too high and those for the noninvestment grade facilities too low, the incentive for 
regulatory arbitrage will remain to exist. 
The internal rating based (IRB) approach allows for much more differentiation 
in credit risk and should significantly reduce the incentives to engage in regulatory 
capital arbitrage. Under this approach capital for credit risk is calculated bottom-up, 
implying that capital requirements are calculated on the asset level and are added up 
at the end. Banks are allowed to determine the values for certain risk parameters based 
on internal models. The following parameters are included: 
 
-Probability of default (PD): probability counterparty is not able to meet its 
obligations 
-Loss given default (LGD): procentual loss in case of default, usually ranges 
from 0-100% 4and is measured on a product basis rather than on a counterpart 
basis 
-Exposure at default (EAD): amount at risk at time of default consisting of 
the amount currently drawn and an estimate of future draw downs available 
(credit conversion factors) 
-Maturity (M): remaining lifetime of the loan, ranges from 0 to 5 years (=cap) 
                                               
 
4
 LGD can exceed 100% because of associated costs, but might also fall under 0% because of penalty 
fees.  
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An important issue for the strength of the IRB approach is the reliability of the 
parameters banks provide. As such, banks will only qualify for the IRB approach, if 
they are able to convince regulators that the models they use are sufficiently 
sophisticated. We can distinguish between the foundation and the advanced IRB 
approach. Under the foundation IRB approach, banks are required to use a 
supervisory value as opposed to an internal estimate for LGD, EAD and M (constant 
at 2.5 years). Furthermore the advanced IRB approach allows to take more collateral 
types into account provided that the bank uses sound internal valuation methods.  
Because of the required investments and sophistication of the IRB approach, 
especially large financial institutions are expected to choose this method. By using the 
internal risk assessments of banks for setting capital requirements, the IRB approach 
promotes the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry. 
The internal systems used for regulatory capital should meet certain criteria and 
supervisory approval. In this view, the IRB approach can be regarded as a 
compromise between a purely regulatory measure of credit risk and a fully internal 
model based approach. 
Under the IRB approach financial institutions have to categorize their 
exposures in at least 5 broad classes of assets with different underlying risk 
characteristics: corporates, banks, sovereigns, retail and equity. For each of these asset 
classes there are risk components, risk-weight functions and minimum requirements. 
The risk components are delivered by the financial institutions themselves. So, the 
IRB approach is much more risk-sensitive than the Standardized approach. However, 
as mentioned before, they are subject to the standards defined by the BIS. 
Furthermore, banks that rely on the foundation approach only estimate PD and for the 
other parameters they rely on supervisory estimates (BIS, 2004).  
The philosophy of the IRB approach is based on the frequency of bank 
insolvencies supervisors are willing to accept5. By means of a stochastic credit 
portfolio model, capital is set to assure that there is only a very small pre-defined 
probability for the amount of unexpected loss to exceed the amount of capital. This 
VAR approach is explained in the figure below. 
 
                                               
 
5
 As mentioned before, in order to prevent moral hazard considerations for banks to take too much risk, 
it is not advisable to completely eliminate the credit risk. 
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Insert Figure 2 About Here 
Under Basel II, capital is set to maintain a fixed confidence level of 99.9%, 
implying that the probability of a bank to suffer losses that exceed capital is on 
average once in a thousand years.  
For the model used in Basel II to be widely applicable, it has to be a portfolio 
invariant model, i.e. the capital required for an exposure only depends on the risk of 
that exposure and not on the portfolio it is added to. As a result of this model 
restriction, the risk weight function under Basel II is based on an Asymptotic Single 
Risk Factor, where all systematic risk that affects borrowers is captured in one single 
risk measure (Gordy, 2003). The underlying assumption is that the bank’s credit 
portfolio consists of a large number of small exposures. If this holds, the idiosyncratic 
risk associated with an individual loan is cancelled out and only the systematic risk 
remains. In the ASRF approach, there is only one systematic risk factor, implying that 
all loans in the portfolio are subject to the same set of market conditions. As a result, 
for a large portfolio of loans, the total capital requirement equals the weighted sum of 
the marginal capitals for individual loans. The model was further specified taking into 
account Merton’s (1973) and Vasicek’s (2002) ground work and resulted in the 
following risk-weight function:  
 
 
 
 
This formula calculates the conditional expected loss based on conditional 
PDs and downturn LGDs. The average PDs that are provided by banks and reflect 
normal business conditions are being transformed in conditional PDs reflecting 
default rates based on a conservative value of the systematic risk factor, through a 
supervisory mapping function. As there is no such function for LGDs banks are 
expected to provide LGD reflecting economic-downturn conditions. The conditional 
expected loss includes both expected and unexpected loss, however as it was decided 
that capital should only cover unexpected loss (the UL concept), a correction for EL is 
required. Further, there is also a maturity adjustment taking into account that long-
term credits are riskier than short-term credits and that these maturity effects are 
stronger for obligors with a low default probability.  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ][ ] ( )( )
( ) ( )( )PDbM
PDbLGDPDGRRPDGRNLGDK
∗−+
∗∗−∗∗−∗−+∗−∗= −−
5.21
5.11)999.0()1/1 15.05.0
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The degree of the obligor’s exposure to the systematic risk component is 
reflected in the asset correlation (R). Under the IRB approach, the asset correlations 
should be determined using a formula of the Basel Committee. These formulas are 
based on the observation that asset correlation increases with size and decreases with 
increasing PD (Lopez, 2004).  
It should be noted that the latter has been contested by several studies (e.g. 
Dietsch et al., 2004). As retail and SME credit are found to be less prone to systematic 
risk, these loans will receive another treatment than corporate loans and will require 
less regulatory capital for a given default probability.  
Besides the fact that the above function does not explicitly take into account 
portfolio and diversification effects, it also ignores the potential correlation between 
PD and LGD and by doing so it potentially underestimates the capital requirement.  
Capital regulation has received a lot of attention over the past decades. 
However, the paragraphs above show that a risk based capital ratio might not be the 
ideal tool to mitigate bank risk (see also Berger et al., 1995). The capital in the 
numerator is difficult to measure and may not always control moral hazard incentives. 
Also the denominator appears to be difficult to measure and even under Basel II can 
be considered to be only a weak reflection of risk. Blum (1999) argues that capital 
adequacy requirements might not reduce risk. Also John et al. (2000) argue that 
capital regulation might not be the ideal tool to control risk. They show that the 
effectiveness of capital regulation depends on the available investment opportunities. 
Based on these flaws and taking into account the fact that the underlying 
objective of capital adequacy is to mitigate bank insolvency risk, it might be that 
regulatory capital is set too high. As a consequence banking cost will increase and 
financial intermediation will be reduced, which both will have a negative impact on 
the economy. Multiple capital ratios, a greater reliance on the private sector 
mechanism, narrow banking etc might be an answer to the identified problems (Avery 
and Berger (1991), Kane (1995), Miller (1995)).  
Also Benston and Kaufman (1996) and Dowd (1999, 2000) have contested the 
arguments in favour of bank capital regulation. They claim that capital adequacy 
regulation is both unnecessary and incapable of improving banks' capital position 
more than the banks could do on their own. In Dowd's view, shareholders can enforce 
proper risk behavior.  
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Flannery and Ranjan (2002) show that the observed increase in capital in US 
banks especially in the second half of 1990s can to a large extent be explained by 
market discipline. More specifically over the past decades a bank’s counterparties 
have become more aware of their exposure to a bank’s default risk.  
Furthermore, many financial institutions seem to hold capital in excess of the 
required amount and therefore the capital requirements imposed by Basel II can not be 
considered as binding.  
The latest Qualitative Impact Study (QIS 5) that measures the expected impact 
of Basel II on the industry even shows that on average and especially under the 
advanced IRB approach, the minimum required capital is expected to drop relative to 
the current accord. In response to this expected drop in regulatory capital, banks in the 
US will have to maintain a 3% tier 1 leverage ratio6 as an additional safety measure. 
Also in Europe there are advocates of this “US leverage ratio” to prevent capital of 
falling below a level that comprises financial stability. 
The reason why banks hold excess capital is to avoid any supervisory 
intervention or to qualify for certain activities. Another reason why capital is higher is 
of course the fact that Basel II fails to recognize certain types of risk (e.g. business 
risk, duration risk7). Previous empirical studies (Peltzman (1970), Mingo (1975), 
Dietrich et al. (1983)), investigating the impact of regulations on equity in the 60s and 
70s, also found regulations did not have an impact on capital levels. Mingo (1975) is 
an exception. Yet, Dietrich et al. (1983) show that Mingo’s findings of significant 
regulatory influence is a proxy for binding deposit rate ceilings, which led banks to 
increase capital to lure depositors.  
Important to keep in mind is that the ultimate goal of financial institutions is to 
maximize shareholder value taking into account the different restrictions and 
obligations they are being confronted with, and thus not blind compliance with 
regulatory measures. Furthermore, the fundamentals underlying capital requirements 
and risk measurement should be extended to the pricing of bank products. This need 
for risk adjusted pricing and consequently risk adjusted performance measures is 
especially important in the search for the creation of shareholder value.  
                                               
 
6
 The leverage ratio equals core capital as a percentage of non-risk weighted assets 
7
 Interest rate risk as a result of a mismatch between fixed rate and variable rate assets and liabilities ( 
Palia et al. (2003)).  
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To conclude this paragraph, we would like to stress that there appears to be a 
lack of consensus among different countries about how to implement Basel II within 
and across borders. This is especially relevant due to the potential implications for 
competitiveness and financial stability. More specifically the competitive effects of 
the differential regulatory treatment of financial instruments might result in allocative 
inefficiency, eventually reducing social value (Berger, 2006). At the launch of Basel 
II the debate about its usefulness and flaws is still ongoing and the ideas of Basel III 
are gradually awaken.  
Now we have developed an understanding of the objectives and calculation of 
regulatory capital, the next paragraphs will go more into detail on economic capital. 
 
III. ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
Next to the regulatory requirements, financial institutions calculate their own 
economic capital reflecting the unexpected losses and true risk according to the 
specific characteristics of their portfolio (Jackson et al., 2002). Economic capital can 
be defined as the amount of capital necessary to support the real economic risk a 
financial institution faces. It is mainly used for internal risk management purposes, 
but has different applications. Depending on the objectives of the tool and availability 
of data, a different methodology is required. 
Although regulatory capital and economic capital are different, they are both a 
reflection of the risks embedded in transactions. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that regulatory capital is not a substitute of economic capital (Araten, 2006 and 
Burns, 2005). Recent papers (Jackson et al., 2002; Elizalde et al., 2006 and Jacobson 
et al. 2006) argue that also under Basel II, regulatory and economic capital will have 
different determinants. The prevalent differences are partially induced by the different 
objectives regulatory and economic capital target, e.g. financial soundness and 
optimization of business strategies, respectively.  
One of their main differences is the implementation of the actual calculations. 
Examples are the different underlying assumptions related to the granularity of the 
portfolio, the different correlations that may be considered in calculating risk, the use 
of caps and floors etc.  The table below gives an overview of the main differences 
between regulatory capital and economic capital.  
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It should be noted that the calculation of economic capital within a financial 
institution and the observed differences with regulatory capital depend on the model 
and parameterization of model inputs.  For a detailed comparative analysis of the 
existing credit risk models we refer to Crouhy et al. (2000) and Allen (2004). The 
table below includes some of the main features of KMV, Credit Metrics and Credit 
Risk+, which are assumed to be reasonable models to quantify economic capital 
(Crouhy et al. (2000)).   
This table is not intended to give an exhaustive overview of all the features of 
the different credit risk models that exist, but rather to give an idea of some important 
differences between them. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Carey (2000) indicates that the success of Basel II in matching economic and 
regulatory capital will depend on the degree to which the IRB approaches will take 
into account portfolio differences related to maturity, granularity and risk 
characteristics. Up until now, the potential match between economic and regulatory 
capital requirements and the strength of the match remains practically unexplored 
(Jacobson et al. 2006). However, in order to further promote financial stability within 
and across financial institutions, and to avoid potential tensions between regulators 
and banks (Jacobson et al., 2006), it is important to identify the drivers behind 
regulatory and economic capital and to understand the strength of the match between 
both. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to promote financial stability, regulatory authorities pay a lot of 
attention to setting minimum capital levels. This paper shows it is not that 
straightforward to find an accurate, easy to calculate capital ratio. Furthermore, the 
effect of capital regulation on both risk mitigation and level of capital seems to be 
highly contested. On top of the regulatory requirements, financial institutions 
calculate their own economic capital reflecting the unexpected losses and true risk 
according to the specific characteristics of their portfolio.  
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In spite of the fact that economic and regulatory are both a reflection of the 
risks embedded in transactions, they differ significantly in their calculations. 
Especially the way both types of capital incorporate diversification and concentration 
effects diverges.  
Eventhough there is an extended literature about capital regulation and Basel 
II, to our knowledge, there is no paper that gives an overall picture about the 
determinants and challenges of both economic and regulatory capital. Furthermore the 
existing literature on economic capital is small and the theoretical comparison to 
regulatory capital remains practically unexplored. With this literature paper we fill 
this void.  
A critical issue in assessing the impact of Basel II on future lending behaviour 
is understanding the relationship between regulatory and economic capital and more 
specifically to understand which of them is the binding constraint. Up until now the 
impact of Basel II on capital requirements, capital levels, capital arbitrage, lending 
behaviour etc has been estimated by different techniques. However, as from 2007 
banks have started implementing it and only recently real data has become available 
and the true impact of Basel II can be assessed.  So there is still a lot of empirical 
research to be done in this field.  
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FIGURE 1 
The three reinforcing pillars of Basel II 
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FIGURE 2 
 
The VAR approach under Basel II 
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TABLE 1  
Comparison between regulatory capital and economic capital 
 
 Economic capital- 
CreditMetrics 
 
Economic capital-
Credit Risk+ 
Economic capital- 
KMV 
Regulatory Capital 
Definition of 
risk8 
Mark-to-market (MTM) Default mode 
(DM) 
MTM or DM DM 
Purpose Investment decisions, 
RAROC-calculations, 
risk-mitigating actions, 
consistent risk-based 
credit limits, and 
rational risk-based 
capital allocations. 
 
Investment decisions, 
RAROC-calculations, 
risk-mitigating actions, 
consistent risk-based 
credit limits, and 
rational risk-based 
capital allocations. 
 
Investment decisions, 
RAROC-calculations,  
risk-mitigating actions, 
consistent risk-based 
credit limits, and rational 
risk-based capital 
allocations. 
 
Financial stability 
External reporting 
Model 
approach 
Credit migration 
(Merton based option 
pricing)   approach 
Actuarial approach 
Reduced-form model 
Structural (Merton based 
option pricing) approach 
(multiple factor) 
Structural approach  (single 
factor) 
Credit event Credit migration Random default rate 
(with Poisson 
distribution) 
Distance to default Default 
Risk horizon Can be chosen (does not 
require  a one  year 
horizon) 
Constant time horizon 
(e.g. 1 year) or hold-to-
maturity horizon 
Can be chosen (from a 
few days to several years) 
1 year 
 
Risk drivers Asset values (proxied 
by equity price) 
Expected default rates 
(no assumptions about 
the causes of default) 
Asset values Standardised: external rating 
IRB: depending on model 
Data issues Likelihood of (joint) 
credit quality migration, 
valuation estimates 
Data: transition matrix, 
credit spreads, yield 
curve, LGD, corr and 
exposures) 
Parsimonious data 
requirements (mean loss 
rates and loss severities) 
Data: default rate, 
volatility, 
macroeconomic factors, 
LGD and exposures 
Data: equity prices, credit 
spreads, corr and 
exposures 
Standardised: external rating 
IRB: depending on model 
Confidence 
level 
Based on target rating 
of FI, 
E.g. AA- (= 99.95%) 
Based on target rating 
of FI, 
E.g. AA- (= 99.95%) 
Based on target rating of 
FI, 
E.g. AA- (= 99.95%) 
Based on target rating of A- 
(=99.9%) 
                                               
 
8
 MTM models also include credit migration risk, DM models only distinguish between default and 
non-default. 
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Risk 
classification 
Ratings 
(credit homogeneous 
issuers within one 
rating class and 
transition probabilities 
are based on historical 
frequencies9) 
Exposure bands Distance to default and 
expected default 
frequency (EDF) 
(issuer specific and  a 
function of capital 
structure, volatility of 
asset returns and current 
asset values) 
Ratings 
PD, LGD, 
EAD 
Basel II models, R-
squared and maturity 
-PD 
 
 
 
 
Full Maturity 
Basel II models, R-
squared and maturity 
-PD 
 
 
 
 
Full Maturity 
Basel II models, R-
squared and maturity 
-PD 
 
 
 
 
Full Maturity 
Basel II model 
 
-PD subject to min of 0.03% 
for all asset classes except 
sovereigns 
-Downturn LGD 
-Maturity remaining 
contractual tenor: 
-floored at 1 year, capped at 
5 year 
-not applicable to retail 
Recovery rate Variable (Beta 
distribution) (taking 
into account 
uncertainty) 
Constant Constant or random Constant 
Valuation Discounted value of 
future CF beyond one 
year and discount factor 
is the forward yield 
curve 
Not used Option pricing 
methodology applied to 
contingent cash flows; 
more specifically the 
Martingale approach 
(discounted expected CF 
based on risk-neutral 
probabilities) 
Standardised: not used 
IRB: depending on model 
Interest rate Fixed credit spread Constant Constant Standardised: not used 
IRB: depending on model 
Income Not used Not used Risk-free rate and 
expected loss as proxy for 
expected income 
Not used 
                                               
 
9
 KMV has shown that this does not hold in reality and might result in an adverse selection of corporate 
customers in banks (Crouhy et al. (2000)). 
26 
 
 
Correlation Based on joint 
probability of 
multivariate normal 
asset 
returns(determined by 
firm specific,   country 
and industry factors) 
Assumption of 
independence or 
correlation with 
expected default rate 
Based on joint probability 
of multivariate normal 
asset returns  (determined 
by firm specific, country 
and industry factors) 
Simple, parameterized 
Does not use 
industry/country 
Concentration Recognised Not recognised Recognised Not recognised 
 
